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Abstract 
 
   Nuclear reversal is the decision by a state, which has a nuclear weapon or the technical 
capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon, to give up their nuclear weapons program.  This 
paper employs the tenets of nuclear missile reversal to the dismantling of ballistic missile 
programs through case studies of the six states (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and South 
Africa) that have abandoned their missile programs since 1987.  The study hopes to promote 
further research concerning the behaviors associated with abandonment of nuclear reversal to 
that of ballistic missile reversal.  This research concludes that the principles of nuclear reversal 
do apply to ballistic missile reversal, in much the same way they explain nuclear reversal.  There 
is no clear overarching explanation, with all of the tenets having merit in the abandonment of 
programs. 
 
Introduction 
 
Nuclear reversal is a relatively new phenomenon that has been explored throughout 
political science research.  States that had the bomb, or the capability to make the bomb within 
a short period of time, sometimes give up their sovereign rights to do so.  Literature suggests 
that there are several motivations that consistently apply to nuclear reversal- economic 
“bargaining” within the domestic regime, the resolution of external security situations, and new 
international norms which dissuade the development or production of nuclear weapons. 
While scholars argue over which is the most salient aspect, or what weights to assign 
each of these explanations, they are widely accepted as being the most parsimonious 
considerations.  Considering the explanatory power that nuclear reversal theory has, it is 
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essential to test the theory and know its depth.  As of now, the theory has only been developed 
to pertain to nuclear reversal.  There are other instances in the international arena that such a 
theory could be applied.  In order to further test nuclear reversal theory, this study attempts to 
apply it to ballistic missiles through a case study of the states that have abandoned their 
ballistic missile ambitions after 1987.     
 
Literature Review: Nuclear Reversal 
Recently, the issue of nuclear reversal has been a salient topic in the discipline.  Yet, the 
literature has not been fully developed, with only a few authors looking specifically at the 
incentive for nuclear reversal.  Of the literature available, there are several key tenets identified 
that lead to nuclear reversal.  Paul has conducted the most extensive look at nuclear reversal, 
with Levite’s research backing up Paul’s conclusions. They found that states are incentivized to 
give up nuclear weapons when their security needs are met, when a change in the domestic 
regime and state’s security and economic interests change, and when new norms diminish the 
appeal of nuclear weapons.  In this case, international pressure emanating from multiple 
sources, or just one source such as the hegemon, is included.  Additionally, Kiernan’s article 
seeks to employ the principle of economic bargaining to nuclear reversal over the preferred 
security literature.  Kiernan looks at the “price” of nuclear weapons versus the state’s 
“willingness to pay” and attempts to find the vantage point where the price is too high.      
 
Paul has a situational approach, not black-boxing the interests of the state.  He asserts 
that while norms have an effect on nuclear states, it is generally because it assures them a sort 
of mutual security.  The impetus to join is really only when other states around the state in 
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question have joined, and the state possesses some notion of nuclear forbearance.  Thus, 
norms are connected to security- and a state in a high security zone will not have incentives to 
join onto international coalitions or be incentivized to join onto regimes such as the NPT (Paul 
2000).   
Paul found that neither norms nor security fully explained the behavior of states in 
nuclear reversal or forbearance. Paul asserts the notion of “prudential realism”, whereby state 
interest directs them to act in their best interests, but those interests are not always driven 
through greater maximization of arms (Paul 2000).  Thus, the national interests of the state may 
be shaped by nuclear non-proliferation norms, or other incentives.    
Levite finds that earlier studies all assert nuclear reversal as being tied to “(1) the 
external security situation of a state improves or alternatives to nuclear weapons emerge that 
make them unnecessary; (2) a change occurs within the domestic regime and the state’s 
security and/or economic orientation (central planning vs. market economy); or (3) systemic or 
state-specific incentives, such as new norms, emerge that diminish the appeal of nuclear 
weapons” (Levite 2003: 10).  Scholars differ in the weight they assign to factors, and often 
disagree over which domestic entity was the driving force for or against nuclear weapons 
acquisition. (Levite 2003). 
Levite’s work supports Paul’s conclusion that there is no overarching explanation for 
nuclear reversal.  In addition, Levite contends that there is considerable variation in the 
characteristics of the reversal processes themselves. He concludes that nuclear reversal is 
driven not by one factor, but by a combination of factors, and the exact combination of varies 
between the cases (or clusters thereof) and over time (Levite 2003). 
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Kiernan offers a hypothesis that is inclusive of security strategies, but with an emphasis 
on cost benefit analysis.  He dubs this new hypothesis “the bargaining approach” adding 
structure and logical precision to the cost/benefit calculation by decomposing it into separate 
variables of “price” and “willingness to pay.” The price variable includes the security and 
political costs in retention of nuclear weapons, international pressure to renounce nuclear 
weapons, and structural factors such as the nature of international regimes. The willingness to 
pay is the function of the benefits states derive from nuclear ownership, as well as other 
subjective benefits. (Kiernan 2010). 
Kiernan uses case studies to illustrate support for this economically based 
comprehensive hypothesis- South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, and Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. 
For South Africa, De Klerk quickly ordered the unilateral demolition of South Africa’s 
nuclear stockpiles upon taking office- which seems inconsistent with the traditional raw 
security analysis.  Kiernan argues that South Africa’s analysis of the price of maintaining the 
nuclear program was proving unsustainable, considering de Klerk’s sensitivity to international 
pressure. (Kiernan 2010). 
The de Klerk regime believed there were now benefits of NPT membership: it would 
pave the way for technical cooperation with the West, as well as lend credibility to the 
country’s liberalization measures. The magnitude of those considerations radically minimized 
the regime’s willingness to “pay” for nuclear weapons. When international factors increased 
that price, the de Klerk regime moved toward nuclear disarmament (Kiernan 2010). 
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Brazil and Argentina pursued weapons capability for reasons of rivalry and prestige, as 
well as security considerations. The key factor in Brazil and Argentina’s decisions to abandon 
their nuclear weapons programs was their eventual political rapprochement, or lessening of 
tensions between the two nations. Leadership and mutual economic engagement further 
improved relations. In 1990, both countries announced they would implement full-scope IAEA 
safeguards, followed by the signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco (nuclear weapons free zone in 
South America) and subsequent signing of the NPT (Kiernan 2010). 
Economics, geography, and the Soviet legacy increased the sensitivity of Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus to Western pressure. In 1991, these three became independent states 
of the Soviet Union.  The old Soviet system failed to provide prosperity and security, and the 
benefits of becoming “normal” countries were obvious. Accession to the NPT was seen as a way 
to demonstrate their new commitment to this normalization, as well as to obtain strategic and 
economic insecurity (Kiernan 2010).  
Kiernan concludes through his analysis that while the traditional notions of security 
were still sound, and actually supported through his usage of the new bargaining hypothesis, 
that bargaining was apparent in all of his cases, and should be subjected to further study. 
Thus, there are two radically similar and one slightly different take on nuclear reversal.  
Paul’s work is reinforced by Levite’s, while Kiernan’s serves to reinforce both, while offering his 
own hypothesis about the bargaining process.  Since all of these explanations hold merit, in 
order to fully understand the application of nuclear reversal theory to ballistic missiles reversal, 
all of them (in varying form) will be explored through the hypotheses. 
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Ballistic Missile Application 
 The circumstances surrounding the abandonment of nuclear weapons are quite similar 
to that surrounding abandoning a missile program.  Both nuclear weapons and missiles are 
instruments of power that may be used as deterrent or compellant threats.  They both serve to 
enhance the security of a state through raw power, and yet may undermine the security of a 
state due to sheer presence within a state.  The norms surrounding their abandonment are 
strikingly similar- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime was created to promote the 
incentivized states to refrain from weaponizing nuclear technology in exchange for assistance 
for developing civilian programs.  In missile reversal, the counterpart to the NPT would be the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, initiated in 1987.  Both the NPT and the MTCR were lead by 
US efforts to stem proliferation in the respected arenas.  Thus, the connections between the 
nuclear reversal and the ballistic missile reversal of programs justifies a look into whether the 
theories applicable to nuclear reversal can explain state behavior in ballistic missile reversal. 
Hypotheses: 
Drawing on the current literature concerning nuclear reversal theory, three hypotheses 
were derived to explain nuclear reversal, and adapted to apply to ballistic missile reversal:  
Hypothesis 1: If the external security situation of a state improves, then the state will 
reverse their ballistic missiles program. (Realist Explanation) 
 Hypothesis 2: If there are state-specific incentives, including global norms, convincingly 
diminish the appeal or availability of missiles/parts or tacit knowledge, then the state will 
reverse its ballistic missile program. (Norms Explanation includes hegemonic influence of the 
U.S.) 
 
 Hypothesis 3: If the state’s price variable (including the security and political costs in 
retention of nuclear weapons, international pressure, and structural factors such as the nature 
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of international regimes) is greater than the willingness to pay (benefits states derive from 
nuclear ownership), then the state will reverse its ballistic missiles program. 
 
Methods: Case Study  
 The Most Different Systems Design was employed to study missile abandonment.  All of 
the cases share the same dependent variable; they all abandoned their ambitions for medium 
range or long range ballistic missile programs after 1987.  There are six cases- Argentina, Brazil, 
Egypt, Iraq, Libya and South Africa.  The cases have a history of development section, followed 
by a ballistic missile reversal portion, whereby the motivations and incentives for ballistic 
missile abandonment are explored. 
Argentina 
History of Development 
 Argentina began developing ballistic missiles for several reasons.  After losing the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands war to the British in 1982 and having conflicts with Chile over the 
Beagle Channel islands, Argentina had security concerns. Argentina's rivalry with Brazil and 
Brazil’s expansion of their space program added to Argentina’s threat perception.  In addition, 
other factors such as political prestige and potential revenue from exports also motivated the 
missile program (NTI 2008).  
  Without the indigenous capability to develop a medium range ballistic missile, Argentina 
enlisted the aid of several European firms to work on the “Condor project”.  The Condor I was 
born in the late 1970s.  The Condor was a single-stage, solid-fuel sounding rocket, with a 
range/payload capability of 100 km/400 kg (Global Security 2005). 
After Condor I, Argentina moved on to desiring a medium range ballistic missile, dubbed 
the Condor II.  The Condor II design was a much more sophisticated version of the Condor I; it 
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was a two-stage solid-fueled missile, which in its final design would have a more advanced 
guidance system.  Iraq expressed interest in funding the Condor II project, provided that the 
resulting product would have a range at least five times that of the Condor I's 150 km range, 
and began a partnership in 1984.  To avoid scrutiny, Iraq agreed to provide funding via Egypt for 
the Condor II program, using Egypt as a go between to Argentina.  Saudi Arabia remained a 
“silent partner,” financially supporting the program, hoping for completed missiles in return 
(NTI 2008). 
In May 1991, Argentina's minister of defense announced the Condor II’s demise. Iraq 
withdrew from the project in 1988, while its own missile program flourished. Argentine officials 
argued that the Condor II was part of a peaceful satellite launch program.  In 1993, Argentina 
handed over most of the components of the secretive Condor II ballistic missile project to the 
US for destruction (Global Security 2005).  
Ballistic Missile Reversal 
The ballistic missile program declined for several key reasons.  The impetuses to have 
the program, once laid to rest, became some of the reasons for dismantling it.  A lessening of 
tensions between Brazil and Argentina assuaged some security concerns.  The passage of the 
MTCR stemmed export ambitions, making the program economically unfeasible.  In addition, 
the MTCR, along with specific pressure from the United States, quelled the program.   
In 1989, Argentina’s new president Carlos Menem took office. Shortly before taking 
power, Menem stated to the Argentine newspaper La Nación that Argentina “did not have the 
political capacity or the international standing to sustain the Condor missile” (NTI 2008). He 
took office facing an impending economic crisis- the inflation rate was 150% per month, and 
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the country $4 billion in arrears in payments on its $64 billion foreign debt (NTI 2008).  Thus, 
the economics of the new administration played out to influence the abandonment of the 
project. 
Finally, during a September 1989 visit to Washington that included a meeting with 
President George H. W. Bush, Menem was told unequivocally that Argentina risked losing U.S. 
credits and funding if it did not halt the Condor program.  In the mid- to late 1980s, the United 
States began to grow concerned about the Condor II project. However, in 1987 the MTCR came 
into existence with France, Italy, and West Germany—all countries with firms participating in 
the Condor program—as members.  The restriction on resources cut down on production.  The 
United States subsequently increased pressure on Buenos Aires to dismantle the burgeoning 
Condor II project. (NTI 2008, Global Security 2005).  
Further, Menem issued a joint declaration on missile technology in 1989 with the 
Brazilian president, Fernando Collor de Mello- the Argentine-Brazilian Joint Declaration on 
Bilateral Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space  relaxed some of the tensions 
between Brazil and Argentina concerning missile and space technology (NTI 2008). 
. Ultimately, the minister of defense announced Argentina's decision to adhere to the 
MTCR and announced that the Condor II made Argentina “more vulnerable, increased 
instability in other parts of the world, and compromised the nation's prestige” (NTI 2008).  By 
1993, the program was dismantled with aid from Spain.  In November 1993, Argentina became 
an official member of the MTCR. (NTI 2008) 
Brazil 
History of Development 
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As one of the world’s largest exporters of arms, Brazil’s development of a space, as well 
as a missiles program, seems to have grown out of a desire to become a missile and technology 
exporter.  In the 1960s, Brazil developed its space program which eventually produced the 
satellite launch vehicle (VLS) (FAS 1996).   
The VLS - Satellite Launch Vehicle is the Brazilian Space Agency's main satellite launch 
vehicle.  The medium-range ballistic missiles under development thereafter are based on the 
Sonda IV.  The Sonda IV was produced indigenously by the National Institute for Space 
Research. This two-stage, solid-fuel missile underwent the fourth of five planned tests in the 
spring of 1989, readying the rocket for use in the VLS (FAS 1996).     
Clearly, there was an issue with the marriage of the Brazilian space program and the 
military usage of the rockets. Hugo de Oliveira Piva, a former head of CTA (Centro Tecnico 
Aeroespacial) (Aerospace Technical Center), Brazil's premier missile lab, was one of the key 
players in the space program. Piva was caught in Iraq with a team of Brazilian missile experts 
when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Piva had a hand in developing the MB/EE and SS-series 
missiles Brazil was working on during the 1980s (The Wisconsin Project 1995).  
   Brazil’s programs suffered from the lack of technological support from countries such as 
the U.S.  "Our biggest concern is Brazil's export law," a senior U.S. official recently told the Risk 
Report.  According to this official, “in the past, there has been a clear pattern of transfer of 
rocket technology to the Air Force, then to private companies, and then out of the country 
through exports. There isn't any technology for the space program that wasn't transferred into 
the missile program” (Wisconsin Project 1995). 
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In addition, two large civilian firms, Orbita and Avibras, were developing a series of 
missiles for export based on the work done by the National Institute for Space Research. Orbita 
was trying to develop a medium-range missile based on the Sonda-IV space rocket with foreign 
financing. As a missile, the rocket could carry a 500 kilogram payload up to 1,800 kilometers.  
Avibras, Brazil's largest weapon exporter, was also working on a line of surface-to-surface 
missiles known as the SS-300 and the SS-1000 (Wisconsin Project 2005). 
Ballistic Missile Reversal 
Brazil’s motivations for missile reversal were security related, as well as priority induced.  
Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso said on August 18, 1995, "Brazil does not 
possess, nor does it produce or intend to produce, to import or export long-range military 
missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. We are presently developing, and 
shall continue to develop, space technology for exclusively peaceful purposes." (FAS 1996).  As 
previously stated in the Argentina case study, the Argentine-Brazilian Joint Declaration on 
Bilateral Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was signed in 1989.  The agreement 
relaxed some of the tensions between Brazil and Argentina concerning missile and space 
technology, and lessened security concerns (NTI 2008). 
The Brazilian Space Agency was put under civilian control in 1994, ending 20 years of 
military control of the space program.  The shift of the more advanced Brazilian program to 
civilian control, and its top-level public commitment to peaceful uses of missile technology, may 
evidence the elimination of any potential threat from subsequent Brazilian missile technology 
developments and exports. (FAS 1996). 
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In effect, Brazil has been forced to make a choice. The big space rocket it is developing, 
the VLS, won't be able to compete with American, Russian, Chinese or European satellite 
launchers unless it is improved. Yet the VLS could not be improved without imports- and Brazil 
could not get the imports without giving up its missile program. " Previously, military control 
over the space program and an ambitious export program of short-range rockets had raised 
concerns that Brazil might develop ballistic missiles and export them to other countries (NTI 
2009). “Our policy is not to support space launch systems in countries that are not members of 
the MTCR," says a U.S. official. Cardoso's decision to give up Brazil's missiles has been touted as 
a  victory for export control (The Wisconsin Project 1995)  
Constraints imposed by the MTCR and strategic technology embargoes have been 
credited as greatly slowing the progress of both countries' ballistic missile programs. Brazil 
curtailed the military potential of its space launch vehicle (SLV) program in the early 1990s and 
joined the MTCR in 1995.  
Some analysts claim that Brazil's adherence to MTCR restrictions compromises the 
organization because Brazil's VLS wasn't canceled and dismantled as a condition of MTCR 
membership.  States such as South Africa terminated a similar program before joining MTCR, 
and Argentina canceled its Condor II before acceding to NPT and joining MTCR. The concern 
about the program was that it could serve as a cover for a parallel ICBM program (FAS 1996).  
Egypt 
History of Development 
 
After losing the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptians became interested in developing 
safeguards against Israel.  The indigenous  program was developed using German V-2 
technology and scientists until Nasser came into power, and dismantled the program.  
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However, after Israel’s air dominance in the Suez War of 1956, Nasser reportedly realized the 
great potential of an indigenous missile production program.  The program restarted again in 
earnest in 1960 (Bermudez 2010:49, NTI 2010 ).   
The establishment of a ballistic missile production infrastructure was created through 
the conversion of existing arms and aircraft factories, and more importantly, the development 
of a ballistic missile test and launch facility (Bermudez 2010:48).  Nasser’s “missile bluff” was 
called in 1967 with the largely unsuccessful air display in the Arab-Israeli War.  Early on in the 
war missiles were deployed but missed their targets and had little effect (NTI 2010).  It seems as 
though the missile program and facility had descended into research status, rather than 
operational status (Bermudez 2010:48).  With the lack of indigenous technological capabilities, 
Egypt sought to acquire ballistic missiles from a foreign power.  Egypt looked to the Soviet 
Union, its largest supplier of arms (Sirrs 2006:20).  FROG 7As and Scud Bs were provided by the 
Soviet Union (NTI 2010).  Egypt's Scud B missiles were used to strike Israel in the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War (Missile Threat 2010).  After 1973 the Soviets refused to cooperate with Egypt in 
further manufacture, tactical assistances, and providing parts for the Scud Bs, due to a cooling 
down in their relationship. Egypt looked elsewhere for partnership, and ultimately moved on to 
North Korea for assistance (NTI 2010 ) 
Egypt was convinced that ballistic missiles would become increasingly significant, 
strategically as well as tactically, in future regional conflicts (Bermudez 2010:49).  Since China 
seemed uninterested in working with Egypt, Egypt pursued a partnership with North Korea (NTI 
2010).  In 1979 or 1980, Egypt provided North Korea with the first Scud Bs.  Using advanced 
construction materials and fuel design, the Project T missile is thought to maintain a 985 kg 
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payload equipped with high power explosives.  Apparently, Cairo and Pyongyang have 
cooperated in Project T manufacture and development post 1980s: in February 1999, Cairo's Al-
Ahram reported that "Egypt is continuing its efforts to develop and produce Scud-B missiles . . . 
In the first half of 1998 Egypt continued to acquire ballistic missile components and related 
equipment from North Korea” (Missile Threat 2010).   
In 1979, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in which both states agreed not to 
deploy or ready their forces for a potential conflict, and began.  Nevertheless, some military 
rivalry between Egypt and Israel continued.  Additionally, Egypt prepared for potential military 
confrontation with Sudan over the Nile and conflict with Libya (NTI 2010).   The ongoing 
security dilemma, as well as the rivalry with Israel, kept the quest for ballistic missiles alive (NTI 
2010).  
Egypt began collaborating with Argentina and Iraq on the Badr-2000, or the Condor II as 
it was called in Argentina (which parallels the Argentine Condor II) in 1984. In September 1989, 
Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified to the House Foreign Affairs Middle East 
Subcommittee that Egypt had terminated its cooperation on the Condor II.  Egypt reportedly 
dropped support due to lack of funding, domestic politics, interagency competition, and 
international pressure (Bermudez 2010:49).     
 
Ballistic Missile Reversal 
 
Ultimately, International pressure with the US as the helm to desist cooperation on the 
Condor II project was evident following the June 1988 attempted smuggling of 200 kg of 
carbon-carbon material from the US.  Two Americans and two Egyptians were charged with 
attempting to ship the material to Egypt, in clear violation of United States export control laws. 
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An Egyptian-born United States citizen named Abdelkader Helmy was indicated.  Helmy was an 
engineer at the Aerojet Solid Propulsion Company in California.  He stated that he met with 
Egypt’s defense minister, General Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, where the general reportedly 
asked for his assistance in buying material for an Egyptian military research and development 
program (Stevenson 1988, Wisconsin Project 2000). In an interview, one of the defendant’s 
lawyers, Marcus S. Topel, identified the program as a joint effort with Argentina and other 
states to develop medium-range ballistic missiles (Stevenson 1988).The material that was 
smuggled is used as a protective coating for ballistic missile warheads, and was allegedly 
destined for the Condor II program(FAS 1996). 
Considering that high level Egyptian officials were implicated, the situation garnered a 
personal call from President Reagan to President Mubarack about the seriousness of the matter 
(NTI 2010).   
 
Iraq 
History of Development 
 
Saddam Hussein's regime sought to develop a long-range ballistic missile capability for 
both conventional purposes as well as the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.  Iraq began 
arming itself with short-range ballistic missiles in 1974 with an exogenous program, purchasing 
819 Scud-B short-range ballistic missiles and 11 MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) 
from the Soviet Union.  The USSR and Iraq continued their partnership throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, whereby the Soviet Union supplied Scuds, support equipment, propellants, and 
conventional warheads (NTI:A 2010). 
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The Scud Bs became strategically irrelevant with the Iran Iraq War in 1980. Iran was able 
to hit Baghdad with its current Scuds, due to its proximity to the Iran-Iraq border. Tehran's 
distance, however, from the border was twice the 300km range of Iraq's Scud-Bs.  Iraq worked 
hurriedly to indigenously increase the Scud-Bs range, and by 1988 the 650km range Al-Hussein 
variant was operational. The Al-Hussein was the only Iraqi missile to be loaded with chemical 
and biological warheads (NTI:A 2010).  
Despite initial successes, flight stability plagued Iraq's Scud modification program. In 
1988, the Iraqis successfully test fired the Al-Abbas, a longer-range version of the Al-Hussein. 
However, they abandoned the program due to continued flight instability and poor missile 
guidance. The Al-Hijarah configuration suffered from similar flight instability problems, and was 
rarely used during the Persian Gulf War (NTI:A 2010).  
In the early 1980s, Iraq expressed interest in funding the Condor II project.  As 
previously shown in the Argentine case study, in order avoid scrutiny, Iraq agreed to provide 
funding via Egypt for the Condor II program, using Egypt as a go between to Argentina (NTI 
Argentina).   By 1989, Iraq had spent at least $400 million on the project, but was unable to 
produce the missile, lacking facilities. Following the Gulf War, Iraq declared to the United 
Nations that it had been unable to produce this missile, which inspectors later confirmed (NTI:A 
2010). 
Iraq began launching Al-Hussein and Al-Hijarah missiles at Coalition forces and Israel 
immediately following the start of the Coalition's air campaign in January 1991. While the 
majority of Iraqi missiles launched during the Gulf War were Al-Husseins, Iraq also fired 5 Al-
Hijarahs.  The missiles' success rate is unclear, since many broke up upon reentry (NTI:A 2010).  
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Following the Gulf War, Iraq attempted to work within the boundaries of UN Security 
Council’s Resolution 687 (which proscribed a 150km range limit), while still maintaining 
technical expertise and missile manufacturing capabilities. Iraq experimented with shorter-
range surface-to-surface missiles, including the Ababil and the Al-Samoud (NTI:A 2010). 
Later, Saddam expelled inspectors from Iraq in late 1998. The inspection hiatus from 
1999 to 2002 played a significant role in the Bush administration's belief that Iraq possessed 
both weapons of mass destruction and proscribed missile capabilities.  Forced to depart 
prematurely on the eve of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, inspectors were unable to determine the 
full extent of Iraq's missile program prior to the war. Late, the U.S. Iraq Survey Group (ISG) 
reported that Saddam had intended to produce long-range delivery systems, potentially to 
deliver weapons of mass destruction once the international community lifted the sanctions it 
had imposed on his regime after the Gulf War (NTI:A 2010). 
Ballistic Missile Reversal 
The Iraqi missile program was abandoned due to the post Gulf War international 
intervention in its program.  The Iraq Survey Group concluded that post-1991 sanctions and 
monitoring had effectively eliminated Iraq's ability to both purchase and produce a long-range 
ballistic missile capability. Yet, the ISG report also noted that Saddam Hussein didn’t intend to 
give up his pursuit of long-range missiles.  Iraq invested in technology and infrastructure, 
retained experienced scientists as well as long-range designs on the books (NTI:A 2010). 
The Persian Gulf War brought much of Iraq's missile program to a halt. Following Iraq's 
defeat in 1991, the UN Security Council implemented resolution 687, which prohibited Iraq 
from possessing ballistic missiles exceeding a 150km range. Inspectors rapidly destroyed most 
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of Iraq's missile capabilities. However, UN resolutions did not prohibit Iraq from retaining the 
scientists and infrastructure underpinning its past missile development successes. Continued 
monitoring would therefore be key in verifying that Iraq had not illicitly restarted its long-range 
missile efforts. In a letter to the UN Security Council dated 16 January 2010, Iraq announced its 
intention to sign the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (NTI:A 2010). 
Libya 
History of Development 
Libya’s ballistic missiles program was largely exogenous, attempting to purchase missiles 
from foreign powers.  However, Libya’s attempts to acquire ballistic missile technology and 
associated systems go back to the mid-1970s. In 1976, Libya purchased around 80 Scud-B 
missiles and launchers from the Soviet Union, and two years later with the purchased 40 FROG 
7 rockets and launchers.  In the late 1970s, Libya also tried unsuccessfully to acquire SS-21 
Scarab short range ballistic missiles from Moscow. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Gaddafi also reportedly approached the Brazilian aerospace consortium Orbita about a 
potential sale of its MB/EE 600km range missile system.  Orbita denied the transfer (NTI: B 
2010).  
In 1980, Tripoli signed a contract with the German firm Orbital Transport und Raketen 
AG (OTRAG, "Orbital Transport and Rockets, Inc.") to develop a missile infrastructure in Libya. 
[However, after two years of development efforts in Libya, and vary of Libya’s military 
intentions, the West German government pressured OTRAG to cease operations in Libya (NTI: B 
2010). 
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Libya’s attempts to either purchase entire systems or develop an indigenous ballistic 
missile production capability continued throughout the 1990s. Reportedly, Libya paid over $31 
million to Iran in exchange for material and tacit technological knowledge with the aim of 
expanding the range of its Scud-B arsenal and finalizing the Al-Fatah project (NTI: B 2010).  
According to the German Federal Intelligence Service, in January 1995 Libya and Iraq 
planned on joint ballistic missile development. German intelligence officials later revealed that 
a series of Scud test launches had taken place in the Southwestern Libyan Desert to increase 
the range of the missiles (NTI: B 2010) 
In June 1999, Indian customs officials at the Northwestern port city Kandla boarded the 
freighter Ku-Wol San owned by Puhung Trading Corp. of North Korea. The officials discovered 
wooden crates designated "water refinery equipment" that actually contained an entire 
assembly line for Scud missile production. The shipment seized included missile nose cones, 
sheet metal for frames, heavy-duty hydraulic pressing machinery, warhead guidance systems, 
calibration and evaluation instruments, and missile engineering blueprints labeled Scud-B and 
Scud-C- heading for Libya (NTI: B 2010). 
In November 1999, U.K. authorities seized another shipment of missile parts bound for 
Libya. At Gatwick airport a cargo flight to Libya via Malta carried 32 crates.  The crates had been 
disguised as automotive spares, but actually contained Scud components of North Korean 
origins. Records indicate that a Taiwanese company had used forged documents to ship the 
missile components through Hong Kong (NTI: B 2010). 
Although two decades had brought little success, Libya plugged along with its program.  
In 2000, China was accused of providing technical expertise to Libya’s missile development 
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efforts.  China reportedly agreed to supply Libya with a hypersonic wind tunnel, a crucial 
component for modeling and simulating missile development. On 6 April of the same year, 
Swiss authorities arrested a Taiwanese businessman at Zurich international airport for 
attempting to smuggle four Scud missile propulsion units in his luggage to Libya (NTI: B 2010).  
Ballistic Missile Reversal 
On  December 19, 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would renounce its pursuit of 
WMD and long range ballistic missile capabilities. The US State Department-led teams arrived in 
Libya for the first time on January 18 of the following year.  By the time the US and UK first 
teams left Libya on January 29, they had already eliminated some of the most proliferation-
sensitive aspects of Libya’s weapons of mass destruction and missile programs (DeSutter 2004: 
4).  
The inspections revealed that although Libya had been frantically trying to improve its 
ballistic missile capabilities, its efforts had been largely unsuccessful. Attempted purchases of 
medium range ballistic missiles or intermediate range ballistic missiles were repeatedly 
thwarted by pressure from the international community (NTI: B 2010). 
The Libyan government announced that it had, of “its own free will,” agreed “to get rid 
of these substances, equipment and programmes and to be free from all internationally banned 
weapons.” Libya states that it had “decided to restrict itself to missiles with a range that comply 
with the standards of the MTCR- while also announcing its intention to comply with the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).  Finally, Libya 
announced that it intended to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, as well as adhere to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (DeSutter 2004:3).   
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South Africa 
History of Development 
A certain amount of South Africa's short-lived ballistic program remains an enigma. 
Although South Africa had developed short-range tactical missiles and rockets since the 1960s, 
a July 1989 test launch of what South Africa called a "booster rocket" confirmed Pretoria also 
had developed a missile program. U.S. intelligence sources noted similarities between the 
South African and Israeli missile programs, prompting speculation of a back-scratching 
arrangement between the two countries. Whether South Africa fully integrated its ballistic 
missile and secret nuclear weapons programs is still unknown (NTI: C 2010). 
The Armaments Corporation (Armscor), South Africa's state-owned arms manufacturer, 
formed a subsidiary in 1978 called Kentron Missiles to work on the research and development 
of missile technology. South Africa developed the Republic of South Africa (RSA) missile series 
under a commercial space launch vehicle program. Armscor also designed nuclear devices that 
could be delivered by aircraft or an RSA missile. Five South African nuclear bombs were 
reportedly configured (NTI: C 2010). 
To support its missile development program, South Africa developed an indigenous 
solid-propellant production capability. The RSA missile was still in development when Pretoria 
announced the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program and its space program. 
According to some claims, the RSA-4 missile may have been capable of delivering a 700kg 
nuclear warhead from South Africa to any location (NTI: C 2010).  
South Africa and Israel had a partnership in developing missile technology.  South Africa 
provided Israel with the uranium and missile test facilities necessary for its strategic weapons 
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programs, while Israel shared advanced aerospace technology with South Africa.  Armscor 
confirmed that the company had over the last six years built a missile test range at Overberg on 
the southern tip of South Africa with the aid of Israel. In 1989, U.S. intelligence sources 
reported that South Africa was close to launching a modified version of Israel's intermediate-
range Jericho II.  A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assessment reportedly suggested that South 
Africa was also preparing to test the more advanced Israeli Shavit space launch vehicle, which 
could be converted into a 3,200km-range missile (NTI: C 2010). 
In July 1989, Armscor announced that it had successfully tested a booster rocket from 
the Overberg test range. Others suggested that the test was of an intermediate-range missile 
and U.S. intelligence officials thought that a short-range missile with a rocket plume almost 
identical to Israel's Jericho II missile had been tested. The test missile flew 1,620 km southeast 
toward Prince Edward Island.  After U.S. officials publicly stated in October 1989 that Israel was 
assisting South Africa in developing a medium-range missile, senior Israeli officials again tried to 
sidestep the issue.  Later, Israeli sources confirmed cooperation with South Africa on a variety 
of projects, notably a joint development of a surface-to-surface missile armed with a nuclear 
warhead (NTI: C 2010). 
. 
Ballistic Missile Reversal 
The MTCR and heavy pressure from the US is credited with ending South Africa’s missile 
program as well as space program.  Domestic concerns, such as the economic viability of the 
space program also played a role. 
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In June 1993 South Africa agreed to refrain from manufacturing long-range missiles and 
to dismantle its capability to produce large space rockets. By this time, South Africa had 
terminated the nuclear program and revealed its existence. President de Klerk announced the 
termination of the SRA-3 and SRA-4 space launch vehicle programs due to questions about the 
“commercial viability” of the South African space industry (NTI: C 2010). 
In September 1991, the U.S. Federal Register notice announced sanctions against South 
Africa for importing ballistic missile technology from Israel, considering that U.S. law prohibits 
U.S. exports of aerospace technology to any foreign entity “exporting or importing missile 
technology in contravention of the MTCR” (NTI: C 2010).  South African President F.W. de Klerk 
protested the sanctions to President George H. W. Bush. After bilateral discussions on the 
economics of space launch vehicles, the South African government announced that it would 
stop subsidizing the space launch vehicle program, with the hope of finding a way to making to 
economically feasible.  The program folded shortly thereafter (NTI: C 2010). 
According to some sources, South Africa was about a year away from perfecting a rocket 
capable of propelling nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads more than 1,200 miles.  The 
prototype was based on the RSA-4 missile, canceled during its development phase.  South 
Africa joined the MTCR in September 1995 (NTI: C 2010). 
Conclusions  
 The case study analysis shows an interesting pattern.  While 3 out of 6 states (Argentina 
and Brazil) highly support the Realist Hypothesis, 4 out of 6 states support the Norms 
Hypothesis, and 4 out of 6 states support the Bargaining Hypothesis. 
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Figure 1.1 Case Study Results 
 
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Argentina Argentina Argentina 
Brazil Brazil Brazil 
South Africa Egypt Libya 
  Iraq South Africa 
  South Africa   
 
 
Brazil and Argentina had mutual interest to reduce tensions with one another in the late 
1980s.  After some transparency into the opposing country’s missile and space programs, as 
well as increased dialogue and economic cooperation, the states had increased security, 
supporting the Realist Hypothesis.  In addition, after the signing of the MTCR, the United States 
was involved with pressuring each state to give up its ballistic missiles, supporting the Norms 
Hypothesis.  In addition, the US publicly embarrassed the Argentines with uncovering the 
smuggling of materials out of the United States for the Egypt/Argentina/Iraq Condor II Program.  
Finally, each state had to come to the point where they realized that being members of the 
MTCR would benefit them more greatly than possessing missiles would have benefited them, 
using the cost/benefit type Bargaining Hypothesis. 
 The Egyptian generally only supports the Norms Based Hypothesis.  The US put major 
pressure on Egypt to discontinue working on the Condor II program, as stated above.  Egypt did 
not gain any security from losing the missiles- Israel still has missiles in the region, as well as an 
ambiguous nuclear weapons policy.  In terms of bargaining, Egypt still has a chemical weapons 
program as well as a questionable biological weapons program.  The benefits of having such 
programs have clearly outweighed the cost in the international arena.  The pressure the US was 
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putting on Egypt, as well as the constraints on the missile program due to the export controls 
under the MTCR, are much more indicative of the Norms Based model. 
 Iraq was basically forced to give up its missile program after the sanctions it suffered 
after the Gulf War in 1991 at the hands of the UN Security Council.  It continued to have other 
programs, such as a chemical weapons program- which seems to fly in the face of the 
Bargaining Hypothesis.  Regional security needs did not change the scope for Iraq considering 
the rise of Iran’s program, and the ambiguous stance of Israel- thus, not satisfying the Realist 
Hypothesis. 
 Libya is an interesting case- while the state claims to have made the motion to give up 
its program by itself, it seems the international community was rather involved, considering the 
UK and US teams deployed there.  However, the US also agreed that Libya took the lead in its 
own dismantlement- and signed various other international agreements such as the BWC, CWC, 
and NPT.  Thus, I did not assign Libya as fitting the Norms Based Hypothesis, but the Bargaining 
Hypothesis.  Libya decided that its actions renouncing weapons of mass destruction, as well as 
missile system, would benefit them more than the incentives to keep these systems. 
 Finally, South Africa seems to fit the Realist Hypothesis, as well as the Norms Based 
Hypothesis and Bargaining Hypothesis.  South Africa gave up its missile system when it seemed 
that national security was better served without the missiles and nuclear weapons- the state 
was more vulnerable with them.  De Klerk came in was more in tuned with international norms 
concerning missiles and weapons, and wanted the international community with South Africa, 
rather than against it.  Finally, tSouth Africa seems to perfectly fit the Bargaining Hypothesis.  
De Klerk was set upon gaining “normalization”, and the benefits of South Africa joining the 
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international community outweighed the security utility that the missile systems would have 
afforded. 
 Thus, all hypotheses are amply supported by the cases offered.  However, much like the 
work done by Levite and Paul, there is no real distinction as to which is more causal and which 
sets may have more weight than others. 
Concerns and Further Research 
 While the research is sound, there may be some bias in the case studies due to the 
incentives of the sources of information to represent competing interests.  Most states are not 
eager to admit that international conventions, much less the US acting as hegemon, gave them 
“religion” and caused them to end their missile ambitions.  Similarly, international regimes such 
as the MTCR have a stake in claiming to have influenced states to give up weapons- the more 
successful the regime, the better the international standing.  In addition, when the hegemon is 
heading up one of these regimes, it too has cause to over-inflate its influence.  This research 
drew from several sources in order to mitigate the bias- some sources with a state- centric 
explanation for reversal, and some from an international viewpoint. 
 The robustness of the findings could be bolstered with statistical analysis of all of the 
cases of ballistic missile reversal, using the theories of nuclear reversal.  While case studies hold 
a distinguished place in political science research, the marriage of quantitative and qualitative 
research is often helpful in identifying strengths and weaknesses within the theory. 
 Finally, the nuclear reversal theory could be applied in other research concerning 
weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical and biological weapons systems.  Levite 
recommends this research be completed back in 2003 in his article “Never Say Never Again”, 
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and no research to date has been found by the author of this article.  It would identify if nuclear 
reversal tenets apply to weapons of mass destruction, and in what capacity.  For instance, 
perhaps international norms apply strongly to nuclear reversal, but only moderately to 
chemical weapons.  This indication could signal to policy makers that perhaps assurances of 
security are a more beneficial route to get the state to reverse its chemical weapons program 
than pressure from an international regime.   
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